The author identifies a need to take a hard look at the analytical methods now used in the Army relating to force structuring, doctrine development, materiel development and tactical analysis. He shows that decisions in the above area depend upon an understanding of the key concept "combat power" and the combat power development process. He contends that much of current analytical methodology, including computer assisted simulations and mathematical ORSA techniques, does not adequately deal with the phenomenon of land combat. Many of the key variables on the battlefield are unquantifiable and thus mathematical models run the risk of biasing results in favor of the purely mechanical aspects of warfare. The author develops an analytical framework for understanding combat power and the process of generating it to win battles which borrows methodology from the social sciences. It relates all army functions and describes how these relate to the development of combat power. It allows the decision maker to recognize the variables he can control in a given situation and the trade offs available to him. This analytical framework has applicability for the teaching of tactics and operations; the evaluation of unit readiness; the development of force structures; the identification of materiel and resource needs; and the development of doctrines and future concepts.